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APPLICABILITY OF THE OHIO STATUTE OF FRAUDS TO AN
ORAL LEASE FOR Two YEARS
An action in forcible entry and detainer was brought by the Shillito
Company to obtain possession of certain real estate which was held by
Roos. Roos claimed under an oral lease for two years, renewable for
two years, with a monthly rental. The tenant had papered the rooms
and repaired the plumbing and claimed that the agreement had been
taken out of the statute of frauds by part performance. The Court of
Appeals of Hamilton County held that Roos was wrongfully withhold-
ing possession as the agreement had not been taken out of the Statute
of Frauds. Roos v. John Shillito Co., 52 Ohio App. 262, Ohio Bar,
Aug. 24, 1936.
Three statutes are pertinent to the problem. Ohio Gen. Code, Sec-
tion 8620 provides, "No lease, * * * shall be assigned or granted except
by deed, or note in writing, * * *." In another chapter of the code,
are the other two relevant statutes. Ohio Gen. Code, Section 8510
provides that a "* * * lease of any estate or interest in real property must
be signed by the grantor, * * *, or lessor, and such signing be acknowl-
edged * * in the presence of two witnesses, who shall attest the sign-
ing* • *." Ohio Gen. Code, Section 8517 states, "Nothing in this
chapter contained shall affect the validity of any lease *, for any term
not exceeding three years, or require such lease to be attested, acknowl-
edged, or recorded." (Italics writer's). Thus Ohio Gen. Code, Section
8620 definitely provides, without exception, that all conveyances of in-
terests in land are entirely void unless in writing. On the other hand,
Ohio Gen. Code Section 8517 states that the formalities set out in
Section 85 1o Gen. Code are not necessary in case of a lease for less than
three years. The effect of violating the statute on formalities for convey-
ances is similar to a violation of the statute of frauds, since the lease
would be void in either event. In Richardson v. Bates, 8 Ohio St. 257
(185 8), the court said, "We regard the two statutes under consideration
as consistent with, and independent of each other." Accordingly, a lease
may be defective under the statute on conveyances, notwithstanding the
fact that it is valid under the statute of frauds. Wineburgh v. Toledo
Corp., 125 Ohio St. 219, 181 N.E. 20, 36 Ohio L. Rep. 307, 82
A.L.R. 1315 (1932).
Although the Ohio statute of frauds does not make any exception
for leases of less than three years duration, the early English statute of
frauds included such an exception. It provided that all leases not in
writing shall have effect of leases at will except all leases of less than
three years. 29 Car. 2, Ch. 3. Holdings under this statute probably
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have affected the decisions in a few early Ohio cases. See Vilber v.
Paine, I Ohio 251 (I824); Grant v. Ramsey, 7 Ohio St. 158 (1857).
There is dictum in this latter case to the effect that possession under an
oral lease for any number of years will make the lease effective at law.
See also La Bounty v. Brumback, 126 Ohio St. 96, 37 Ohio L. Rep.
381, 184 N.E. 5 (i933).
These early Ohio cases might be interpreted to mean that a lease
of less than three years was not intended to be within the Ohio statute
of frauds. Or they may mean that oral leases can be sustained at law
upon the doctrine of part performance. For an excellent discussion of
this point, see Carey v. Richards, 2 Ohio Dec. Rep. 630, 4 W.L.M. 251
(i 86o), in which the court pointed out, at page 635, that the dictum
in Grant v. Ramsey, supra, was not in line with the law of Ohio. This
raises the question of whether part performance is an equitable doctrine
-r a doctrine applicable in law. In the case of Wilber v. Paine, supra,
the court said that it was a legal doctrine. In another case, in an action
for money only, it was also held to be a legal doctrine. La Bounty v.
Brumback, supra. Where a lease was defective under Ohio Gen. Code,
Section 85 10, it was held to be an equitable doctrine. Wheeler v. Nims,
23 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 527, 20 Ohio L. Rep. 332 (1921). In accord:
Ossage v. Foley, 20 Ohio App. i6, 153 N.E. 117 (1923); Kling,
admr. v. Bordner, 65 Ohio St. 86, 6i N.E. 148 (1901); Carey v.
Richards, supra; Connelley v. Byerley, 20 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 321, 28
Ohio Dec. 150 (1917); Hodges v. Ettinger, 46 Ohio App. 307, 39
Ohio L.Rep. 402 (i933). These decisions indicate that in Ohio part
performance is an equitable doctrine. See, Hodges v. Ettinger, 127 Ohio
St. 460, 39 Ohio L.Rep. 653, 189 N.E. 113 (i934), in which the
court limits the La Bounty case, supra.
Vhat is sufficient part performance to take an agreement out of the
statute of frauds is a question that cannot be answered definitely. The
payment of consideration alone is not enough in Ohio. Newman v.
Newman, 103 Ohio St. 230, 133 N.E. 70, 18 A.L.R. io89 (1921);
Townsend v. Fenton, 32 Minn. 482, 21 N.W. 726 (884). Nor will
the taking of possession take a lease out of the operation of the statute,
unless there are certain unequivocal acts connected with the possession
which cannot be separated from the agreement. Myers v. Croswell, 45
Ohio St. 543, i5 N.E. 866 (1888); but see, Stark v. Turner, 23
Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 313, 19 Ohio L. Rep. 392 (1921); Seamen v.
zlschernmann, 51 Wis. 678, 8 N.W. 818 (188i). In enforcing oral
contracts for the sale of land, equity's jurisdiction is generally based on
the ground of "fraud." The term "fraud" is used in the sense of in-
justice where there has been such part performance by the complaining
88 LAW JOURNAL- DECEMBER, 1936
party that he cannot be restored to his original position. In such a case,
equity will not permit the other party to escape from the obligations of
his contract. Purcell v. Coleman, 6 Dist. Col. 59 (1864); Townsend
v. Fenton, supra; Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts, 3d Ed.
1926, page 245; for cases dealing with leases, see note 49 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 113. For acts which do or do not amount to a sufficient part
performance, see Pomeroy, supra, page 267.
Aside from a doctrine of part performance, occupancy and payment
of rent under a void lease may have significant consequences. Although
a void lease does not create a legal term, entry under such an agreement
and payment of rent may result in the implication of a periodic tenancy.
R. R. Co. v. West, 57 Ohio St. 161, 49 N.E. 344 (1897); Wine-
burgh v. Toledo Corp., supra. This may be so even though no rent has
been paid. Rex Amusement Co. v. Nolan, i i Ohio App. 318, 30 Ohio
C.A. 193, 16 Ohio L.Rep. 349 (1918). The duration of the tenancy
which is implied depends upon the terms as to the payment of rent and
the tenancy is subject to all the provisions of the lease, except as to
duration. R. R. Co. v. West, supra; Lithograph Bldg. Co. v. Watt, 96
Ohio St. 74, 117 N.E. 25 (1917). Where monthly payments are
made under an oral lease, a tenancy from month to month is created,
but where the reservation is of annual rent, it is a tenancy from year to
year. Wineburgh v. Toledo Corp., supra; R. R. Co. v. West, supra.
As to the foregoing propositions Ohio is in accord with the general rule.
Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, Vol. I, pages 123-135. The Ohio pe-
riodic tenancy differs from the common law periodic tenancy in that the
Ohio tenancy is terminable without advance notice at the expiration of a
rent period. The common law rule is that in a year to year tenancy
six months notice is necessary, and in lesser periodic tenancies, such as
month to month, a full period's notice is necessary. At common law a
periodic tenancy was thought of as a continuing estate, which view
apparently does not exist in Ohio. Gladwel v. Holcomb, 6o Ohio St.
427, 54 N.E. 473 (1899); see, Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, Vol.
II, page 1427.
The principal case would seem to have been decided correctly. The
two year lease was clearly within the terms of Ohio Gen. Code, Section
8620, the statute of frauds. The Court was justified in its conclusion
that there was not sufficient part performance to take the agreement
out of the statute of fraud. On the other hand, there was a periodic
tenancy created by occupancy and reservation of rent. As the rent
reserved was a monthly one, the tenancy was one from month to month.
And so under the Ohio view the tenancy was terminable at the end of
any rent month. SAM ToPOLOSKY.
